This article briefly explores the reasons why the Committee of the Regions (CoR) has only partially accomplished its representative function. It is divided into three parts. In the first part I argue that the ambiguous nature of the CoR is the consequence of the polysemous notion of 'region' in EU law (Palermo, 2005) 
Goals and Structure of the Research
This article is divided into three parts. In the first part I argue that the ambiguous nature of the CoR is the consequence of the polysemous notion of 'region' in EU law (Palermo 2005) and of the wide ranging and heterogeneous approach to the 'federal issue' in Europe. An explanation for this is that regions do not have a common position, and this is, again, the product of constitutional heterogeneity at the national level (see Gamper 
The Idea of the Committee of the Regions as a Third Chamber in the EU
Scholars interested in EU studies have been debating whether the EU is a bicameral system (see Norton 2006) for a long time, and even after the entry into force of the Lisbon entry research has suggested that the European Parliament and the Council are not put on equal footing in the co-decision procedure (Hagemann and Høyland 2010) . Against this background some scholarly works have sometimes treated the EU as a sort of tricameral system, by describing either the national parliaments (although in 'virtual' terms, Cooper, 2012) , after the introduction of the Early Warning System (EWM) or the Committee of the Regions, as the third chamber of the Union. The CoR itself has sometimes referred to this idea in some official documents, this is the case, for instance, of the White Paper on multilevel governance adopted by the Committee on 16 June 2009. V Drawing from this, and other documents, scholars have described this idea in the following terms:
'The CoR is saying that, given the representative and political mandate of its members, it cannot simply be considered as a technical consultative body but it must be given a central role in EU policy-making as is appropriate for a representative, political chamber. It is saying, even more boldly, that the CoR is the third representative chamber of the Union after the chamber that represents the citizens of the Union (the Parliament) and the chamber that represents the Member States of the Union (the Council). Multilevel governance, thus, acquires a more precise meaning, because the levels to be considered in the future
Europe cannot be just two, but three and more' (Piattoni 2013).
However, on closer inspection there is no comparative model behind this reference to tricameralism. In other words, those (including the CoR itself) who speak of the Committee as a third chamber of the EU were not advocating the transplant of some E -100 tricameral experience, present elsewhere, into the supranational context. The origin of this idea is therefore connected to a particular political atmosphere that characterised the EU after c.1988 and belongs to a time which was very rich in political announcements. This article explores the main reasons that have led to such a scenario focusing in particular on five factors.
The first factor is the polysemous notion of 'region' in the EU. As Conzelmann wrote, this concept 'is not necessarily tied to any sort of constitutional or administrative structure but is rather a socially constructed concept: A region emerges where actors are coming together on the basis of geographic proximity and a shared problem or opportunity' (Conzelmann 2008) . In this sense we can say that the composition of the Committee does not correspond exactly to the notion of Region adopted by the NUTS ('Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics'), because of the lack of correspondence between the legal notion and the economic notion of Region. This issue is also connected with the ambiguous terminology employed in EU cohesion policies, where terms like 'region' or 'regionalism' are used in several contexts: regional community, regional society, regionstate, regional complex (Hettne and Söderbaum 2002).
Nevertheless, it must be said that in the past scholars have noticed a process of (partial) adaptation of the internal territorial configuration of the legal order to the criteria used by This is the good side, which results in a sort of respect of the domestic vertical division of powers between center and periphery; we could call it 'territorial autonomy'.
However, there is also a negative side of the coin, represented by the impossibility of using the domestic separation of powers as a shield to justify non-compliance with EU law:
'A Member State is thus not entitled to hide behind the domestic division of powers or federal structure in order to avoid the CJEU making a finding of an infringement or to escape its obligation to bring such infringement to an end' (Lenaerts 2012).
In this sense this indifference towards the territorial organisation established by (main text and Protocols), Fasone wondered whether it is now possible to speak of 'A Regionally Oriented EU' and noticed that these provisions appear 'finally to overturn the dogma of "regional blindness" which so far has characterised the EU approach towards the constitutional architecture of the Member States' (Fasone 2017: 57).
The fifth reason, perhaps the most intriguing one, is related to what Piattoni called the 'the problematic coexistence of functional and territorial representation in the EU' (Piattoni 2011). This leads us to the heart of the problem and to the schizophrenia that has characterised-since its inception -the CoR. In other words, ' The CoR was caught between two potentially conflicting visions: on the one hand, it was seen as a representative chamber of regional interests and minority nationalisms; on the other, it was seen as consultative committee of regional and local experts ' (Piattoni and Schönlau 2015) .
This also explains the limited success of the Committee, and why regional actors over fora that could be used by regions. This has led to the need to rethink its role, as the partnership concluded with CARLE and REGLEG confirms.
The Importance of the Lisbon Treaty
Lisbon did not give the CoR the status of a Union institution, but however granted it important powers, especially in respect of changes introduced to reinforce the principle of subsidiarity.
The literature on subsidiarity is massive (Estrella 2002; Syrpis 2004; Davies 2006a; Schütze 2009; Fasone 2013) and there is no need to rehearse it for the purpose of this article. However, it is possible to argue that one of the goals of the Lisbon Treaty was to strengthen the principle, and this has been done by clarifying the competences of the EU and by introducing some political safeguards capable of ensuring its -so to sayphysiological functioning. Indeed, the subsidiarity principle, on the one hand, needs an arrangement of competences at least tending towards a clear sharing of tasks, and, on the other hand, also presupposes an 'integrated' system like, for example, that of a federal arrangement of a cooperative type (Schütze 2009). As a matter of fact, the principle, as regulated in Art. 5.3 TEU, refers to a relationship between two institutional actors (a lower actor, the 'regional and local level', and a higher actor, the 'central level') sharing the same E -106 power. However, the exercise of this power is preferentially given to the subject which is closer to the citizens (i.e. the regional or local level). Scholars usually label this first instance as the negative side of subsidiarity since it implies the duty of non-intervention by the centre. At the same time, this principle allows for the possibility for the centre to replace the 'peripherical actor' if the same power can be exercised in a better or in a more efficient way by the higher subject (the Union). Against this background subsidiarity works as an elevator (Bin 2002 , Panara 2015 with regard to certain fungible acts that can be exercised by two institutional subjects and the centripetal substitution and exercise of this power can be caused only by an objective impossibility to 'sufficiently' carry out the requested action for the peripherical actor. Another important fact is that such an impossibility to carry out the functions must be temporal. In this respect, it has been pointed out that the subsidiarity principle works, actually, as a criterion for shifting, although not in a definitive way, the level that is supposed to intervene (Massa Pinto 2003) . Moreover, because of its constitutional relevance, it also serves as an element of flexibility in the system (Bin, 1999) .
This would explain why, within the Community context, subsidiarity has operated as a 'method of policy centralisation' (Davies 2006b) rather than as a validating factor for decentred realities, in the absence of a formal catalogue of competences. Subsidiarity and competence are not, nevertheless, in a relationship of identity: in fact, it has been said that the principle of subsidiarity is not intended so much for an a priori formal allocation of competences, but rather for an a posteriori legitimation of the exercise of competences beyond those formally attributed (Massa Pinto 2003) .
Subsidiarity has successfully operated in a context such as Germany, which does not define competences in a finalistic manner (Carrozza 2003) as the European Treaties did in the pre-Lisbon phase. This worrying mingling of legal styles explains the destabilisation factor that may be introduced by the subsidiarity principle, and that is why when it was introduced Toth described it as 'totally alien' to the EU, since it 'contradicts the logic, structure and wording of the founding treaties and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice' (Toth 1993) . This is mainly because of its 'surreptitious' substitution of the flexibility clause, which has allowed the Union (and before it the Community) to acquire 'slices of competence', indirectly instrumental to the achievement of the declared objectives, without the procedural guarantee of unanimity. 
E -108
As we saw, subsidiarity and competence are two distinct yet strongly related concepts and, in this respect, a detailed distribution of powers in the configuration of the Union might be useful for the CJEU, since it might help the latter to implement the constitutional nature of the subsidiarity principle under lesser political pressure. However, perhaps the most important innovation is represented by the principle of loyal cooperation (Art. 4.3 TEU).
XX One could argue that this principle was already present in the spirit of former Art. 'The opt-in clauses and voluntary participation in an EU scheme cannot be used as an argument to claim that the proposal has no subsidiarity relevance as long as this scheme involves EU funding aimed at achieving objectives set in the Treaties that are relevant to all EU Member States. Indeed, any EU funding must be granted with a view to objectives set in the EU Treaties and have a legal basis directly relating to the objectives that it is intended to achieve'. XXXI In light of these considerations the resolution sent a warning to the Commission by concluding that the CoR 'stands ready to make full use of its prerogative to challenge the legislative act before the Court of Justice of the European Union'.
XXXII
To my knowledge the CoR has not yet concretised this menace but it is evident from these lines that it would be eager to do that if necessary.
Final Remarks
In this article I tried to explain the main reasons behind the limited success -or, 'Yet, they also stressed that this form of horizontal cooperation between the (self-proclaimed) legislative regions should not be regarded as the evidence that the CoR is becoming increasingly passé for them.
These same respondents stressed the fact that the CoR has concluded strategic partnership agreements with both REGLEG and CALRE so as to maximise the complementarity between these two networks.
The Committee was said to maintain its 'main hub' function for both these selective networks. In this regard attention was also drawn to the fact that both CALRE and REGLEG are networks that lack the resources such as those available to the CoR and that the yearly rotating presidency of these two networks sometimes hampers their effectiveness (depending on the presidency). The institutional embedding in the CoR of CALRE and REGLEG is thus welcomed by the legislative regions.' 
TFEU: 'The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of legislative acts, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament and of the European Council intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. It shall also review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers. The Court shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions brought by the Court of Auditors, by the European Central Bank and by the Committee of the Regions for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives. Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures. Acts setting up bodies, offices and agencies of the Union may lay down specific conditions and arrangements concerning actions brought by natural or legal persons against acts of these bodies, offices or agencies intended to produce legal effects in relation to

